USSR
THOUGHT: "The Utilization of the Forces of the Navyissile/Nucleary Roar-Admiral V. Lisyutin.
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A reliable source (B) .
Followingerbatim translation of an article titled "The Utilization of the Forces of the Navyissile/Nuclearritten by Rear-Admiral V. Lisyutin*.
This article appeared in1 First Issuepecial version of the Soviet military journal Voyonnaya Mysi (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. 1 First Issue was consigned to the press on
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The Utilization of the Forces of tbe Navy
issile/Nuclear War
by
Rear-Admiral V. Lisyutln
Each type of armed forces has its strong and weak aspects. By combining the strong sides of the different types of armed forces,combat missions can be accomplished in the most effective way under various conditions. There cannot be an absolute,jeanon^ capable of accomplishing every mission In the most effective way under all possible conditions. For this reason the different types of our armed forces are developed according to their combat characteristics and capacity to accomplish the main missionsaroncrete historical situation.
One of the main strategic missions in contemporary warfare is the disorganization of the.conoisy. Tt- is accomplished"malnly'by "missile troops of strategic designation who can take action successfully against stationary economic targets, most of which are known in advance. However, besides the latter, there are also mobile economic objectives, in particular transport ships.' It is known that the aggressive capitalist countries have at their disposal aboutillion registered tons of dry cargo-carrying tonnage and more thanillion registered tons of tankers. It can be surmised, naturally, that the probable enemy, preparing' toissile/nuclear war, could have all this onnage fully loaded in advance and under way at sea ori dispersed far away from large economic centers. The I
economic supplies on these mobile objectives are very 1
considerable and couldig influence onof armed combat, especially in its initialtroops of strategic designation cannot yet strikesuch mobile objectives effectively. Thisissionaviation and the
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Arother most important mission facing the armedhe destruction of tht enemy's means of nuclears even more complicated as, besides the fact that most of these means will be dispersed, under cover andonsiderable part of them will prove to be, at the beginningar, not on land, but on the seas and oceans carried on mobileircraft carriers, missile carriers, submarines and in maneuvering supply detachments (manevreanyy otryad snabzheniya).
Xf one calculates, on the basis of the norms adopted in tbe United States Navy for supplying vessles with nuclear weapons, intended for operations against shore and sea objectives, then, it will turn out that notr 6jercent of all.available nuclear warheads' will be concentrated on vessels. In the seagoing supply bases there will also be not less than one complete unit of fire, so that altogether at the beginningar, vessels and supply^sbips may be carrying up tooercent of all..the probable enemy's available nuclear warheads, which cannot be attacked by surface-to-surface (nazemnyy) ballistic missiles, but must be destroyed by the "forces.of the Navy. onsiderable part of the second basicestruction of the enemy's mobile nuclear means ofust also be accomplished by the Navy in cooperation with aviation.
In comparison with other types of armed forces, the Navy has very important combat characteristics and possibilities peculiar to itself. These possibilities are considerably enhanced by the introduction of missile/nuclear weapons and atomic power plants in vessels.
In conditionsudden outbreakissile/ nuclear war, the Navy has greater combat stability than the other types of armed forces, owing to the possibility of being at dispersed basesong stretch of coastline, and alsc of being able to put to sea in advance. Dispersed naval forces will riot presenfan attractive target, to an enemy for strikes by the
enemy's multi-megaton nuclear chargeshe use of vhlcb is most likely at the beginningar, at the time when the large units of other types of armed forces, though dispersed over large areas, can be subjected to great destructionesult of such strikes.
Zf the problem of withdrawing these or other forces from the enemy's first missile/nuclear strikes has not been solved successfully, their employment in tho war is very problematical. The possible dlspersl of and partial cover for such forces will not enable them to avoid losses, and consequently, to retain their full combat effectiveness. the most mobile type of armedviation, wblch, under certain conditions can be withdrawn directlytrike, will, if deprived of airfields, lose its combat effectivenessonsiderable extent. On the other hand, naval forces deployed at sea, with their mainubmarines, cruising submerged, can be withdrawn most successfullytrike, and can, therefore, be used with full combat effectiveness during the first strikes at the enemy.
The most Important quality, peculiar to the Navy, is its ability to deliver powerful strikes at moving objectives at scTI The forces of the Navy, armed with modern missile/nuclear weapons,igh degree of operafional-corcbai capacity. Thus, the operational-strategic exercise conducted by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy in0 showed that even one submarine with an atomic power plant can make repeated attacksarrier strike large unit at sea and destroy one or two large vessels. rigade of such submarines can successfully accomplish the mission ofarrier strike large unit consisting of several aircraft carriers and operatingefinite direction occupying, along the front /two or three words mlssing"7. The destructionarrier strike largo unituclear warheads means that the enemy is deprived of these nucloar warheads for use against our installations.
If one considers the possibility of repeatedof the carrier strike large units, then their destruction will save us from many hundreds and even thousands of nuclear strikes.
In the near future the United States will have up totomic submarines, armednd possibly more, "Polaris" type ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. In the course of one cruise these submarines will be able to use upnd more nuclear warheads against our installations, and if resupplied twice atpuclear warheads. It is mainly the Navy that can conduct combat against such submarines.
The arming of our submarines with ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads makesery effective weapons in the accomplishment of the mission of disorganizing the enemy's economy and destroying his means of nuclear attack. It is true that ln some respects submarines armed with ballistic missiles are inferior to surface-to-surface ballistic missile installations (lower accuracy of fire, reduced readiness in view of the necessity to deploy and take up firing positions,ut they also have important advantages.
While surface-to-surface missile installations cannotignificant number of salvos in present-day conditions from the same position without suffering retaliatoryubmarine, especially in launching missiles when submerged, can successfully make use of its whole unit of fire of missiles from one position, remaining under way all the time.
Possessing high maneuverability andissile-carrying submarine will, in the initial period of war, prove to be the least vulnerable and most stable combat means, capable of delivering sudden and powerful nuclear strikes in important directions.
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Id modernll ground means are vulnerable to effective action froa enemy nuclear weapons. Moreover, if they are not destroyed, they will be in tbe zone of radioactive contamination, which will reduce considerably their con - effectiveness. On tbe otherissile-carrylog submarine, being under water, is not vulnerable to radioactive contamination, and can always bypass dangerous zones.
Uisslle-carrylng submarines, being least vulnerableudden missile/nuclear attack by the enemy, canpecial weapon in the hands of the Supreme High Command. It la not mandatory to use them Immediately on the outbreakar; they can be held in reserve for accomplishing missions directed toward the successful completion of the initial period of war. With the possibility of resupplylng missile-carrying submarines at sea, use can be made of them repeatedly (both at the very beginningar, as well as during its initial period and subsequently).
Thus, the Havy possesses Important operational-combat capabilities and advantageously complements the missile troops of strategic designation In the accomplishment of the most lmportaot strategic missions with which the armed forces are faced. However, the methods of uslog these capabilities of the Navy and the methods of conducting aaval operations require, In our opinion, further serious elaboration.
Even during the most important exercises
games, we have hitherto, in essence, consideredof tho Navy only at the very outbreak
a war, and not during tbe whole of its initial period, which has afforded possibility for studying only questions connected with delivering the first strike. It is essontial to work out the complete accomplishment of the basic missions during the initial eriodar, and foremost in the theoretical field.
Let us examine, briefly, the main missions of the Navy, the possible conditions, and tbe methods for their accomplishment.
The destruction of tho strike forces of the eneny's Wavy, includiog strike aircraft carriers, vessels, and, in the near future, atomic submarine nlssllo carriers, is one of the priority tasks of the Navy.
At the beginningar the probable enemy is able to deploy up to seven carrier strike large unitsach consisting on the average of three aircraft carriers, three cruisers armed with missiles, andoestroyers, armed partly with antiaircraft missiles. It is most probable that these carrier strike large units will be distributed in theaters in the following way: North, Pacific, mediterranean Sea and Indianach.
Combat with carrier strike large units must be conducted in three directions; destruction of the AUS themselves, destruction of their mobile supply detachments at sea, and destruction of the naval bases at which tbey are based.
The destruction of the AOS at sea (in the ocean) must be tbe main mission of submarines, missile aviation, of the Navy and long-range aviation. Tbe destruction of mobile supply detachments at sea. Insofar as they are beyond the range of aircraft, will be the mission of submarines. Finally, the destruction of the bases of carrier strike large units (including tho shore bases of carrier aircraft) must be accomplished by missile troops of strategic designation. The use of missile-carrying submarines for the latter mission Is also not excluded.
Taking into account the striving of the probable enemy toar suddenly, it may bo expected that at its outbreak all strike aircraft carrier and missile-carrier large units will not be al bases, but at sea, at the takeoff lines of deck-based aircraft for strikes. So long as the AUS remain beyond these lines before the beginning of military operations, there would Id most cases be no grounds for action against
them before they approach these lines. Consequently, our forces should be daployed on the probable lines where the enemy's deckbased aircraft will take off. Here, too, should be concentrated the main efforts of atomic and diesel-battery submarines and missile aircraft using nuclear weapons, for the most part.
The complications Involved in deploying forces whenudden nuclear strike by the enemy at the outbreakar, and the striving to employ strike aircraft carriers in accordance with the principle of swift approach, strike, and rapid withdrawal, cannot always create conditions for the complete destruction of carrier strike large units with the first strike, which will require continuation of operations until the mission is fully completed. In such circumstances, missile aircraft, after reloading, prepareepeated strike at the AUS when the latterew attempt to approach the line for launching deckbased aircrat, while atomic submarines pursue the enemy and Inflict repeated blows on hlra. An especially advantageous time for such strikes will be the period when the vessels are being resupplied and refueled by the mobile supply detachments, which must also be objectives for strikes by atomic submarines.
At the beginning of combat operations, diesel-battery submarines, disregarding the lines of takeoff for deckbased aircraft, should move farther aheadiew to inflicting preventive strikes on aircraft carriers before the carriers repeat their approach to the line of takeoff for deckbased aircraft. Naturally, after the beginning of combat operations, the lines where the main efforts are to be concentrated should be selectediew to delivering strikes on the AUS before they approach to within range of deckbased aircraft. Atomic submarines, making use of their great maneuverability, can deliver strikes on AUS in the ocean wherever they overtake them.
Such can be the general scheme for the complete accomplishment of the mission of destroying each AUS.
Combat with missile-carrying submarines which, on the outbreak of war, will also be deployed "in lines from which missiles can be launched, should take form from operations for the destruction of the submarines themselves, their shore bases, and their mobile aupply bases at sea.
The'most probable areas of deployment of mlssile-carrying'submarin.es. will-be the. Northern.Arctic ZonearreT the Norwegian Sea, which open up the shortest route to targets which are in the depth of our country, and are for that reason least accessible to the enemy's main carrier of nuclearircraft (hence the most Important strategic significance of combat with missile-carrying submarines, especially ln the Northern Arctic Zone). This is fully confirmedtudy of the operations of United States atomic submarines mainly in the Northern Arctic Zone. At the same time, the possibility of operations by missile-carrying submarines from other Important directions is not excluded.
According to the system adopted ln the United States for the distribution of targets among the different types of armed forces, targets for tbe Navy are situatedepth of upms from the coast. Taking the maximum range of fire of submarines with ballistic missiles of the "Polaris" typems, tbe main efforts against submarines lo the initial periodar must be concentrated on the lines from which they would launch their.istancems and0 miles) from the coast.
The main forces that will be involved in accomplishing the mission of destroying submarines in distant areas will be submarines, antisubmarine aircraft, and antisubmarine vessels. Aa positional means of detecting and destroying submarines cannot be set up ln peacetime in neutral waters, reliance should not be placed on their wide use in the initial periodar.
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Maneuvering antisubmarine forces could be concentrated without hindrance before the beginning of combat operations on the lines of operations of missile-carrying submarines, and after detecting the submarines they could maintain bydroacoustic contact with them until an order for using weapons is received or until tbey make their first attempt to launch missiles.
Accomplishing the mission of detecting submarines in the extensive areas of seas and oceans demands an excessively large expenditure of existing forces and weapons, which calls for the creation of new means permitting the surveillance of extensive water areas in short periods of time. In this respect, tbe greatest capabilities are possessed by long-range seaplanes making use of small sonar buoys, and also by antisubmarine vessels carrying antisubmarine helicopters. Armed with antiaircraft missiles, surface antisubmarine vessels could considerably extend their zone of operations.
Combat against missile-carrying submarines can be conducted most successfully by antisubmarine submarines in all conditions, especially in areas of pack and drifting ice. In areas of clear water and broken ice, use can be made to aome extent of antisubmarine aircraft and helicopters. An automated system of lines of radlo-hydroacoustlc stations and cable-hydrophone lines set up on the ice can significantly facilitate the detection of submarines in conditions of Ice.
The destruction in the ocean of mobile supply bases for missile-carrying submarines should be carried out by our submarines operating against the mobile supply detachments of carrier strike large units or by specially allocated submarines, if tbe areas of operations of the missile-carrying submarines and the AUS of the enemy do not coincide.
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The destruction of the stationary bases ofwell as of the bases of carrier strike largebe accomplished by the missile troops of
Submarines have now become the principal striking force at sea. In accordance with this, combat against them must Inevitably change fromype of defense to the basic offensive mission in Hrutruyiiu: tlies lorces at era . Combat' at sea is going under water. Forces operating against submarines will eventually become the basic strike forces of the Navy.
The existing antisubmarine forces and weaponsNavy, with the exception of submarines, cancarry on combat with enemy submarines onlycoastal zone. This is far from adequate. forces, as the basic moans of combatfuture main strike forces of the enemy Navy, have great future, and special attention must be paid
their development.
Combat against missile-carrying submarinesew problem. Ways of solving it are still under investigation. It Is possible that In the future they will turn to some extent into combat between "twoind" (between submarines) under water.
The probable enemy, intending to carry on an aggressive war against the countries of the Socialist Camp across the ocean and not relying on holding tbe bridgeheads now occupied by him on the Eurasian continent, will inevitably attempt to make major landings In order to seize now bridgeheads or to reestablish the situation on them, and also to undertake sea shipping in order to supply the groupings established in those areas. In this connection the question arises: wbcro, how, and with what forces can combat with landing forces(and also with convoys on communication linos) of the enemy be conducted most effectively?
The view is expressed that: "Enemy landing operations, while enroute at sea, do not merit expensive and cumbersome operations against them by the Navy and long-range aviation The basis of their annihilation can be by missile strikes
in embarkation and debarkation areas; while onroute at sea, it is again more expedient to annihilate landing forces by strikes with missiles having nuclear charges of several megatons".
There are, of course, many ways ln which any mission can be accomplished. In selecting them, the aim should be to accomplish each mission as quickly as possible, using the minimum forces and suffering the smallest losses. ore detailed examination of the questions of combat against enemy landing forces, we come up against the following circumstances which militate against accomplishing the mission ln the way outlined above.
A landing force at embarkation ports cannot as yet be an objective for missiles with nuclear and, even less, with conventional warheads. As experience in the Second World War has shown, landing dotachments arc formed at many ports which arc not even situated on the same continents (Sicilian and Normandy landing operations, landings in northwest Africa, etc.). At present the enemy Is workingystem of operational and combat training of embarking landing troops where there are no ports, and he la building ships adapted for this. Consequently, the embarkationanding force will most probably take placeery wide front on an undeveloped coast. The simplest calculations show that an enormous expenditure of ballistic missiles will be required to achieve even some effect in strikesanding force while it is boarding its ships.
It is most probablearge enemy landing force will proceed in the form of many small detachments from various directions ln dispersed combat formations and orders. Therefore, one can hardly consideranding force at sea willuitable target for missiles with nuclear warheads of several megatons.
1. "The Theory of Military Art Needsy Colonel-General A. Gastilovich, 'Special Collection of Articles of the Journalirst
To deliberately rely Id all cases on destroying enemy landing forces on our coast after their disembarkation or while they are disembarking,would mean to make it possible for the enemy to accomplish the preliminary mission of his operation unhindered and to put our defenseery unfavorable situation. Landings have always been made, and apparently will be made, when there is.great superiority in forces over the defenders. It must be surmised that in the first place the enemy will aim at ensuring his superiority in nuclear weapons in the landing area. anding will be precededreliminary and direct neutralization in the full depth of our defensive forces. It is, therefore, in our view, manifestly disadvantageous to deliberately postpone combat with the landing forces until this period.
Moreover, another fundamentally Important circumstance is involved. Would it be right to transfer the zone of nuclear combat to our territory? We believe not. The course of turning one's own territoryesolate wilderness can obviously be followed only In certain directions, and then only n the most exceptional cases.
Consequently, it'Is clearly inexpedient and dangerous to accept the scheme outlined above' for our operations in combat with enemy landing forces.
An entirely different situation is created when the Havy operates against the landing force at sea.
Calculations and experience during combat training of recent years show that even one atomic submarine armed with torpedoes can destroy more thanhips with troops and supplies (approximately one division of tbe landing force). One atomic submarine is also capable of destroying one or two large surface vessels of the screening forces, including strike carriers, which carryuclear warheads. Is this "expensive" compared with the price wepay If the enemy uses the indicated nuclear power against objectives
oa our territory, and after thatanding? Other calculations could also be put forward to show that destruction of the enemy forces at sea will always be cheaper and more simple than combat with him when he is already on our territory.
Thus, until missiles attain the capability of destroying mobile sea targets at long ranges, there are no reasons for abandoning actionanding force at sea, and even less for transferring nuclear combat with it to our territory.
Figures were given above regarding dry cargo-carrying and tanker tonnage which could be loaded by the beginningar. If stocks of strategic raw materials are laid down in advance, this transport fleet can be used in the first instance for shipping having military significance. It is known that up to three-quarters of the probable enemy's resources in materiel and personnel are across the ocean. Calculations show thatransports must arrive daily in European ports alone. If one estimates ten days for crossing the North Atlantic and returning In ballast, it can be surmised that on this communicationhips, excluding escort vessels, will be at sea at the same time.
By stopping, holding up, or reducing tothis flow of troops and supplies to theof war, ovenhort time,decisive periods of combat, we wouldifficult situation and create theconditions for our own armed forces. the strategic significance of the mission destroying the enemy's sea communicationthe accomplishment of this task the Navy hasoperational-combat capabilities inother types of armed
Study of the experience of the operational training of NATO navies, as well as elementary calculations, show that the problem of giving security to such strained
lines cannot be fully solved by the probable enemy, owing both to the shortage of existing forces and means as well as to the impossibility of replenishing and restoring them under conditions of the disorganization of the shipbuilding industry.
It is known that besides tbe system of ordinary convoys, the probable enemy is looking for new ways of accomplishing the mission of protecting communication lines. Thus, he has studied the question ofhichesser ratio between theforces and the escorted transports. It is possible to accomplish the mission of securing the most crowded communication lines by the method of "patrolledith ships moving in them without escorts, which provides not only economy of escort forces but, what is especiallyuicker turnaround on the part of the transports. This method springs directly from the zonal system of defense in sea theaters adopted by NATO. Single use (without escort) may also be raado of fast liners on communication lines, mainly for the transportation of troops (some of them can carry uphousandounded, radio-electronic, medical, and other equipment and other materiel in short supply.
The striving for more reliable security of sea transport can be seen from the proposed new lino of development in the building of transports by the main capitalist countries. It finds its expression in the building of container (konteynernoye) and trailer (traylernoye) ships which can be unloaded and loaded quickly, in the building of ships with their own means of loading andwo or three words missing7 capability of loading and unloading without tying up, andonsiderable Increase of the speeds of all transport vessels. The use of submarine transport vessels, especially tankers with atomic propulsion, is contemplated in the future. As in the past, great attention is given to the development of transport-landing and debarking means.
The probable enemy's great dependence on sea and ocean communication lines and the Impossibility of securing them reliablyar give rise not only to the necessity or taking action against his sea and ocean communication linos, but also create favorable conditions for the accomplishment of this mission by the forces of the Navy.
The disruption of sea and ocean communication lines cannot,in our view, be an urgent task immediately on the outbreakar, for the enemy apparently counts on ensuring accomplishment of the missions of the Initial stagear by laying in supplies in advance at the planned bridgeheads. Some time is also required for the organization of communication lines. The forming of convoys and their movement from ports in the United States to Western-European ports will take two to three weeks. There is information that the Anglo-American command is going into the question of sending "monster-convoys" from ports on the eastern coast of the United States to Western-European portsthe beginningar. It is most probablewill be faced with the problem of securing communication lines in their entirety during the concluding period of the combat for attaining the objectives of the initial stage of the war, ln particular for restoring the situation in important areas, for establishing new bridgeheads, and supplying the appropriate groupings of armed forces there.
In order to fulfil the task of disrupting the enemy's sea and ocean communication lines, it will be necessary to redeploy our submarines, which raises the most important problem of resupplying submarines in the ocean, as one cannot count on doing this at shore bases which have been subjected to destruction, not to mention the fact that there will be no time for this.
In previous wars, operations on communication lines continued throughout the whole war. The ports where loading and unloading took place wero not subjectod to significant destruction; the shipbuilding Industry succeeded not only in restoring the losses of tonnage, but in increasing it, while tbe use of conventional weapons against ships at sea did not give decisive results either in economic or military respects.
Presont-day conditions have created opportunities for achieving decisive results in combat on communication lines. Any ports where loading and unloading take place, and communication line centers on land,can now bo subjected to destruction by missile/nuclear weapons which will often .produce far greater results than those attained by the protracted combat on communication lines in previous wars. For instance, the putting-out of action of tbe Panama Canal would lengthen the sea route from eastern United States ports to western ports from five thousand to thirteen thousand miles, or, in other words, would at once reduce transport possibilities on this communication line threefold. The putting-out of operation of the Suez Canal during the attempted armed intervention ln Egypt by the British and French, evenomparatively short period of time, when oil from the Near East had to be transported partly around Africa, forced the West European countries to ration fuel.
Under conditions of missile/nuclear war, theindustry will be the focus ofbased on extenslvo cooperation
among many branches of industry, it is particularly vulnerable to disorganization. Consequently, there can be no question of restoring tonnageargo scalear. At the same time, the operational-combat capabilities of tbe forces of the Navy, and especially of submarines, ln disrupting sea and ocean communication lines, have, as we have already pointed out, Increased considerably. All this points to the fact that effective results in the accomplishment of this mission can now be attained more quickly than before.
Operations for the disruption of sea and ocean communication lines should, under modern conditions, be built, not on the principle of protracted, so-callod "systematic operations"onstant exertion of forces, as was the case heretofore, but on the principle of maximum concentration of forces on decisive axesimited time. An Interruption In communication lines, evenonth, where tbe enemy has large-scale personnel and materiel losses in the main theaters of the war, will create favorable conditions for the successful execution of combat by our armed forces on tho major axes.
The effective accomplishment by tbe Navy of tho basic tasks examined above demands the carrying out of appropriate measures both in the makeup of the Navy and in tbe organization of Its comprehensive support. What are these measures?
1. In tbe first place, the forces which will take part In accomplishing the main tasksar should be developed In every possible way:
atomic submarines, armed with missile/nuclear weapons and long-range torpodoos;
naval strike missile aircraft, not wheeledwhich are entirely dependent on airfields, but seaplanes;
long-range antisubmarine strike forces -submarines, seaplanes, helicopters, andsurface vessels.
Increasing autonomy, units of fire of weapons, and radius of operation,must be tho main requirement in the development of those forces.
2. Insofar as the operations of our forces, especially of submarines far away from their bases, involve their return to base after using up their units of fire, which leadsreat reduction in their coefficient of Combat 'utilization, the main problem for ensuring that the.forces can operate effectively is in supplying them with
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missile/nuclear weapons and torpedoes and in resupplylng them at sea with material-technical resources.
It would bc most expedient to follow the course of creating transport seaplanes capable of operating from bases located on internal waterways in the depth of the country and of delivering tbe necessary types of ammunition and supplies quickly to any areas of the ocean. The accomplishment of this mission will bo made much easier If efforts are made at the same time to reduce the dimensions and weight of missile/nuclear weapons, which would considerably simplify resupply work at sea.
Tbe first reloading of submarines at sea In the Initial periodar could be carried out to some extont by using modified transports and merchant ships sent in advanco to designated areas of the ocean which aro poorly watched.
We should also follow the course of creating secret depots, especially under water, in specially selected areas situated close to the areas of combat operations of our submarines.
The question of creating new, or reconstructing existing, dlcsel-battery submarines for service as supply bases also merits attention.
The creation of special floating supply bases, especially for missile/nuclear weapons and torpedoes, which have maneuverability and are less vulnerable than depots located on land, is absolutely essential for supplying our forces away from permanent naval basos which could be subjected to destruction at tbe very beginningar.
3. In view of tbe vulnerability of the main economic installations and naval bases to missile/nuclear strikes from the very beginningar, one cannot count on being able to carry out regular and lengthy repairs to the forces of the Navy. Only the unit method (agregatnyy metod) of repair (replacement of entire mechanisms, assemblies, aubassemblles-mekhaniznv, uzel, blokjcan solve this problom. Ropairs by the unit method can be carried out by tbo crew itself in any conditions, including at
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provided that the appropriate units are delivered there.
It is the task of industry, and not of shipbuilding yards and naval workshops, to support the unit method of carrying outtoorking stock (oborotnyy fond) of mechanisms and assemblies ln advance.
He have lagged behind in methods of repairing vessels, and if these archaic methods are also followed in wartime then it is doubtful if any of our vessels will be able to put to sea again once their technical norms of maintenance of mechanisms and weapons have run out or they have been damaged ln combat.
It is mainly the working stock of units that calls for repairs, and not the vessels themselves. It is necessary to provide the vessels only with the necessary assemblies for replacement. utureessel under repairaseasualty vessel.
4. In view of the possibility of destroying basic economic installations at tbe beginningar, one cannot count on being able to produce scans of combat on large scales during the course of the war. This applies particularly to the Navy, as tbe production of its forces and weapons during hostilities is most In comparison with other types of armed forces, ln the construction of submarines and surface vessels we observe the most extensive collaboration between the many branches of industry, and parallel with this, small-series production. The production of each vessel takes very much longer than the production of an airplane, missile, tank, or other types of weapons.
Consequently, for the Navy, the problem of creating and maintainingigh state of readiness both the forces themselves and all types of supplies arises in an especially acute form. Under present-day conditions It would be rash and dangerous to rely on "amblingn accumulating reserves in the course of the war and making use of them during pauses of some sort.
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The preparation of forces and accumulation of supplies
in advance willuccessful solution to the problem, both in the caseong, as well asomparatively short, war. The necessity of accomplishing the main tasksar in the shortest possible time must be one of the most important starting points in the reexamination of the operational art of the Navy (and, incidentally, as is obvious, of all the other types of armed forces).
Original document.
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